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The market for loyalties: 
agenda-setting for a Global 
Communications Commission 
by Prof Monroe E. Price, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva 
University, New York, USA 
T HE EXTENSIVE REFORMS of the International Telecommunication Union, the result of extraordinary efforts over the last decade to redefine the future of international regulation, 
have not reduced the call for even stronger global jurisdiction over the 
booming growth and cascading transnational impact of telecoms and 
media organisations. In this essay, I examine the underlying tensions that 
make international agreement on a Global Communications Commission, 
with tough law-making and regulatory authority, so hard to achieve. 
My method is to project from the national experience to the transnational. I 
argue that media law and regulation, in the national context, enacts what I 
call a market for loyalties. Law serves to mediate among groups competing 
to affect or control national identity. Only if there is consensus among the 
major competitors in this market (which, as we shall see, is different from the 
market for goods), does law come effectively into play. Media law and 
regulation, with important, but irrelevant exceptions, exists, generally, for the 
convenience of those whom it is designed to serve. 
The market for loyalties works on the global level as well as the national. 
What is true for the theory of development of a national or regional 
regulatory system applies with at least equal weight at the more universal. 
Without a consensus among those who compete in a global market for 
loyalties, law cannot evolve. Bureaucratic or administrative solutions to a 
problem that has so substantially divided the negotiating countries seem 
highly unlikely. Perhaps existing bodies will accrete power or new entities 
will be established. But the greater possibility is that in the absence of 
something like "the state" more informal, flexible, less visible mechanisms 
will continue to operate to shape the market. 
Euphemisms-such as level playing field or the free market-are employed 
to mask conflicts, Too much is at stake, at present, and there is too much 
uncertainly for there to be agreement on the harsh political and economic 
questions yet unresolved. Contests for geopolitical advantage, in terms of 
economic shares and ideological shares as well, are too lively for the 
participants to allow their resolution to be regulated and foreclosed. For 
example, the "level playing field" aspiration hides the fact that it is not 
sufficiently clear what the dimensions of the field should be, what constitutes 
levelness, and in whose interest a level playing field (or other metaphor 
disguising changed balances of power) must lie. 
The rise of the nation-state 
The experience in the nation-state is helpful in understanding the potential 
for global regulation for yet another reason. The very rise of the nation-state 
can be tied to its role in the regulation of the mass media. Scholars such as 
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Benedict Anderson have written 
about the role that the changing 
dynamics of the press had on the 
kind of community that was 
imagined, and how nation-states 
grew and gained or lost power from 
such changed conceptions. A similar 
transformation is occurring now, as 
technology-satellites, electronic 
highways, relentlessly global 
telephony, have qualities that make 
them seem unregulable, bursting 
from existing political boundaries. 1 
Just as the rise of the nation-state 
was useful in bringing order to 
competition among media within its 
borders, a global communications 
entity can be brought into being to 
bring order to the transnational 
competition existing today. But for 
that to be the case, the first point 
returns: there must either be the 
coercive force that comes with 
sovereignty or a consensus that 
order-the cartelisation of 
identities-is desired. 
Delineating a market for loyalties, 
then, can help us understand the 
legal and political responses to the 
gigantic, mysterious transformations 
now taking place in media industries 
as telecommunications becomes 
more global, confounding national 
borders and the reach of national 
legislation. As political boundaries 
crumble and new nations are 
created, the central function of the 
state in manufacturing identities 
becomes more clear. I explore the 
bond between the nature of the 
media and the endurance of the state 
to explain the potential bond 
between the nature of technology 
and the existence of a global 
regulatory order. 
A. Locating the Market 
Let me turn, then, to the relationship 
of media to regulation in the nation-
state. It is somewhat easier to 
describe a market for goods than a 
market for loyalties. In a market for 
automobiles or sugar, there are 
usually identifiable buyers and 
sellers; there is a market-clearing 
price and a means for settling 
accounts. To establish a market for 
loyalties, it is difficult to locate exact 
counterparts: the major "sellers" or 
producers are the manufacturers of 
identities, classically the 
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government, but others as well such 
as interest groups and businesses as 
a class, those for whom myths and 
dreams and history can be converted 
into power and wealth.2 The 
"buyers" are citizens, subjects, 
nationals, consumers-individuals 
or their surrogates-receivers of the 
packages of information, 
propaganda, advertisements, drama 
aqd news propounded by the media. 
The consumer can, and does, "pay" 
for one set of identities or another in 
several ways which, together, we 
call "loyalty" or "citizenship." But 
the price is not in the ordinary coin 
of the realm. More often, the charge 
for loyalties includes the payment of 
taxes, the obeying of laws, and the 
readiness to fight in the armed 
services. Indeed, merely staying 
within the dominion of a state, 
where migration is an option, can 
constitute a form of payment for 
loyalty. 
One has to look at the producers or 
supply side as well. The supply side 
in the market for loyalties has a 
structure which is disserved by 
reductionist terms like "state" or 
"government" or "political party." 
Sometimes, citizens have little choice 
in terms of national identity, with 
only a single seller (or a small, 
relatively undifferentiated group) 
with which to deal. Were this 
usually the case, there still might be 
a market, but it would tend toward 
the qualities of a totalitarian society 
in which the cost of disloyalty is 
high and in which the competition is 
almost always outlawed.3 On the 
supply side of national identities, the 
market for loyalties is enriched by 
the potential instabilities of all 
national identities, and the fact that 
the choice among them is, at least at 
a moment of some instability, more 
varied and competitive than might 
usually be the case. What we may 
commonly mean by a modern 
"transition society" is a post-socialist 
entity where the formal market for 
loyalties is no longer monopolistic, 
though the transition could 
ultimately be from one form of 
monopoly or near-monopoly over 
identities to another. 
The economic model provides 
insight into what the government 
considers its most important 
potential competition in its effort to 
maintain power, since these 
competitors are most likely to be 
taxed or proscribed or otherWise 
discriminated against. Here, the 
question is what products constitute 
IJ substitutes" in the market for 
loyalties. In that sense, the 
preoccupation that European 
governments long have had with 
competition from commercial 
broadcasters suggests that their 
impact on allegiances was perceived 
to constitute a substitute for more 
traditional packages of identity. 
Advertising persuades individuals 
to consume rather than to save and 
invest; in this and other ways, the 
cumulative impact of advertising 
has consequences for particular 
visions of the public good. 
Marketers of historic or traditional 
or nation-based national identities 
compete with sellers of consumer 
goods, who are trying to impress the 
citizen with an identity that ties 
them to a world or global 
community. 
B. Media Structures and 
Barriers to Entry 
Enormous effort is expended by 
governments everywhere to 
articulate, shape, and reinforce 
images considered vital to their 
continuance, images that constitute 
versions of national identity, what 
Seton-Watson has called "official 
nationalism," the conscious effort of 
government to shape a set of 
narratives that provide a cohesive 
framework for ongoing state 
legitimacy. The question is how 
these efforts have been manifested in 
the market for loyalties, how they 
have been affected by changed 
technology, and how they will be 
limited, again, by the changes that 
are forthcoming. 
One of R. H. Coase's early economic 
analyses of law showed how 
regulation, in Britain, was used to 
limit competition from radio signals 
from France and Luxembourg. His 
history of the early BBe suggested 
how a medium, with transnational 
potential, was seized by internal 
interest groups, using law to exclude 
external competition. With 
important exceptions, often 
propaganda-related, broadcasting 
was turned into an essentially 
nation-based enterprise for its first 
half-century. 
In the Western European states, this 
phenomenon was captured by the 
virtually universal practice of 
limiting broadcasting competition 
for national identities, until the mid-
1970s, primarily to entities 
controlled by government or closely 
related to it. If there was to be a 
competition for loyalties, it would be 
mediated through the government. 
These were not oppressive states, 
and they respected freedom of 
information. But the monopoly over 
the twentieth-century's most 
powerful medium was a reflection of 
strong state participation in the 
market for loyalties; it was difficult 
to surrender and often important to 
the internal mediating, suppression 
or working out of differences. 
The Dutch System 
I will focus on the Dutch radio and 
television system long famous for its 
intricate recognition of specific 
separated perceptions of Dutch 
national identities. I do so precisely 
to show how important national 
control of the medium was to the 
working out of a market for 
loyalties. Consistent with a political 
philosophy that assumes "pillarised" 
segments of society-Catholic, 
Protestant, liberal and socialist-the 
Dutch have established a television 
system that, for a long time, gave 
each segment its own 
unencumbered opportunity to 
broadcast, first on radio, then on 
television. Competition was among 
these groups for allocation of time 
available, with awards dependent on 
numbers of members they had. 
Internal informal sanctions, 
including taboos imposed by the 
groups themselves,4 rendered these 
pillarised broadcasting organisations 
powerful reinforcers of separate 
visions of Dutch identity, to limit, as 
it were, interbrand competition. 
What is interesting is not only the 
rules that determined what groups 
could participate, but the effort to 
exclude competitors that would pose 
a challenge to all of them. These 
included "pirates," spill-over 
signals, and, finally, directed 
programming from abroad using 
satellite and cable. 
The existing favoured interest 
groups, with government as the 
organising entity, used domestic 
law, multilateral agreements, resort 
to transnational regulatory bodies-
whatever technique was possible, to 
retain national control over the mix 
and content of signals. The Dutch 
situation remains complicated. In 
terms of the economic model, 
however, the history of broadcasting 
in the Netherlands is illuminating 
for many reasons. Here was a place 
where the system was originally and 
explicitly designed to identify 
alternative proponents of a national 
identity and careful to allocate 
markets among them. These 
competitors, as might well be 
expected, sought to exclude others 
who might reduce their market 
share. Competition from abroads 
altered the capacity of the state to 
preserve the strength of the existing 
competitors or stabilise the ability of 
those who continued to seek to 
market loyalties to use the media to 
reinforce particular identities.6 
One can say that the European 
Union serves as the next higher 
institution for the organisation of the 
media at a time when, as with the 
Netherlands, the technological 
capacity of the state to perform the 
function diminishes. An issue for the 
Union will be whether it is a 
practicable unit for policing a market 
for loyal ties and enforcing rules for 
entry and competition within it. 
Turkey provides another dramatic 
history of the effort to maintain 
control over national identity. 
Article 133 of the Constitution gave 
Turkish Radio and Television 
Authority (TRT), at least until mid-
1993, a monopoly over broadcasting. 
TRT was not only monopolistic, "it 
was also essentially the voice of the 
state, disseminating the unitary 
ideology and culture of Turkish 
republicanism and highly 
susceptible to government 
intervention." TRT remains charged, 
by statute, with "promoting the 
values of country, unity, republic, 
public order, harmony, and welfare, 
and to strengthen the principles of 
Kemal Ataturk's reforms."7 In an 
environment in which there had 
been deep divisions about alternate 
national identities, TRT, as the 
proponent of the modern secular 
state, was seen as an instrument for 
cohesiveness. When the number of 
channels available was expanded in 
the 1980s to bring programme 
availability closer to world 
standards, the new channels, at the 
time, were all made part of TRT. 
When TRT was attacked for leaning 
to the left and broadcasting 
-programs that legitimated Islamic 
fundamentalism-a doctrine 
considered hostile to the secular 
state-the agency's director genera] 
was forced to resign.8 
Examples in which law is used to 
protect particular national identities 
can be reproduced in Belgium, 
Germany, in China, almost 
everywhere: in each case 
demonstrating how national 
legislation is used in widespread 
fashion to allocate internal markets 
and to establish, where possible, 
cartels of allegiances. 
C. New technology, globalism 
and the market for loyalties 
The primary function of 
international legal organisations, 
until recently, has been to preserve 
the power of the nation-state to 
regulate its own market for loyalties. 
To put it in the words of the 
American poet, Robert Frost, "good 
fences make good neighbours." The 
task of the lTV could be redescribed 
as the design and registration of 
such fences and the enforcement of 
anti-poaching principles. 
To understand that historic function, 
difficult in itself, and not always 
whOlly articulated, is indispensable 
for coming to grips with the 
complexity of a transition to wholly 
different expectations. National 
markets, constrained by borders, 
were long the key determiner of the 
market. For most of the century, the 
international order assumed that 
radio transmissions were primarily 
within the boundaries of one nation; 
the international function was to 
dispense frequencies so as to assure 
that these conditions of market 
division were met and enforced. 
International regulations and 
arrangements were built on the 
assumption of limiting broadcasting 
to "national service of good quality 
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was turned into an essentially 
nation-based enterprise for its first 
half-century. 
In the Western European states, this 
phenomenon was captured by the 
virtually universal practice of 
limiting broadcasting competition 
for national identities, until the mid-
1970s, primarily to entities 
controlled by government or closely 
related to it. If there was to be a 
competition for loyalties, it would be 
mediated through the government. 
These were not oppressive states, 
and they respected freedom of 
information. But the monopoly over 
the twentieth-centurys most 
powerful medium was a reflection of 
strong state participation in the 
market for loyalties; it was difficult 
to surrender and often important to 
the internal mediating, suppression 
or working out of differences. 
The Dutch System 
I will focus on the Dutch radio and 
television system long famous for its 
intricate recognition of specific 
separated perceptions of Dutch 
national identities. I do so precisely 
to show how important national 
control of the medium was to the 
working out of a market for 
loyalties. Consistent with a political 
philosophy that assumes "pillarised" 
segments of society-Catholic, 
Protestant, liberal and socialist-the 
Dutch,have established a television 
system that, for a long time, gave 
each segment its own 
unencumbered opportunity to 
broadcast, first on radio, then on 
television. Competition was among 
these groups for allocation of time 
available, with awards dependent on 
numbers of members they had. 
Internal informal sanctions, 
including taboos imposed by the 
groups themselves,4 rendered these 
pillarised broadcasting organisations 
powerful reinforcers of separate 
visions of Dutch identity, to limit, as 
it were, interbrand competition, 
What is interesting is not only the 
rules that determined what groups 
could participate, but the effort to 
exclude competitors that would pose 
a challenge to all of them. These 
included "pirates," spill-over 
signals, and, finally, directed 
programming from abroad using 
satellite and cable. 
The existing favoured interest 
groups, with govermnent as the 
organising entity, used domestic 
law, multilateral agreements, resort 
to transnational regulatory bodies-
whatever teclmique was possible, to 
retain national control over the mix 
and content of signals. The Dutch 
situation remains complicated. In 
terms of the economic model, 
however, the history of broadcasting 
in the Netherlands is illuminating 
for many reasons. Here was a place 
where the system was originally and 
explicitly designed to identify 
alternative proponents of a national 
identity and careful to allocate 
markets among them, These 
competitors, as might well be 
expected, sought to exclude others 
who might reduce their market 
share. Competition from abroad5 
altered the capacity of the state to 
preserve the strength of the existing 
competitors or stabilise the ability of 
those who continued to seek to 
market loyalties to use the media to 
reinforce particular identities.6 
One can say that the European 
Union serves as the next higher 
institution for the organisation of the 
media at a time when, as with the 
Netherlands, the technological 
capacity of the state to perform the 
function diminishes. An issue for the 
Union will be whether it is a 
practicable unit for policing a market 
for loyal ties and enforcing rules for 
entry and competition within it. 
Turkey provides another dramatic 
history of the effort to maintain 
control over national identity. 
Article 133 of the Constitution gave 
Turkish Radio and Television 
AuthOrity (TRT), at least until mid-
1993, a monopoly over broadcasting. 
TRT was not only monopolistic, "it 
was also essentially the voice of the 
state, disseminating the unitary 
ideology and culture of Turkish 
republicanism and highly 
susceptible to govermnent 
intervention." TRT remains charged, 
by statute, with "promoting the 
values of country, unity, republic, 
public order, harmony, and welfare, 
and to strengthen the principles of 
Kemal Ataturk's reforms,"7 In an 
environment in which there had 
been deep divisions about alternate 
national identities, TRT, as the 
proponent of the modern secular 
state, was seen as an instrument for 
cohesiveness. When the number of 
channels available was expanded in 
the 1980s to bring programme 
availability closer to world 
standards, the new channels, at the 
time, were all made part of TRT. 
When TRT was attacked for leaning 
to the left and broadcasting 
programs that legitimated Islamic 
fundamentalism-a doctrine 
considered hostile to the secular 
state-the agency's director general 
was forced to resign. 8 
Examples in which law is used to 
protect particular national identities 
can be reproduced in Belgium, 
Germany, in China, almost 
everywhere: in each case 
demonstrating how national 
legislation is used in widespread 
fashion to allocate internal markets 
and to establish, where possible, 
cartels of allegiances. 
C. New technology, globalism 
and the market for loyalties 
The primary function of 
international legal organisations, 
until recently, has been to preserve 
the power of the nation-state to 
regulate its own market for loyalties. 
To put it in the words of the 
American poet, Robert Frost, II good 
fences make good neighbours." The 
task of the lTV could be redescribed 
as the design and registration of 
such fences and the enforcement of 
anti-poaching principles. 
To understand that historic function, 
difficult in itself, and not always 
wholly articulated, is indispensable 
for coming to grips with the 
complexity of a transition to wholly 
different expectations. National 
markets, constrained by borders, 
were long the key determiner of the 
market. For most of the century, the 
international order assumed that 
radio transmissions were primarily 
within the boundaries of one nation; 
the international function was to 
dispense frequencies so as to assure 
that these conditions of market 
division were met and enforced. 
International regulations and 
arrangements were built on the 
assumption of limiting broadcasting 
to "national service of good quality 
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within the frontiers of the country 
concerned." In the interludes 
between the Great Wars, there were, 
for example, bilateral and 
multilateral agreements to control 
propaganda subversive to the state 
system. For example, the League of 
Nations' sponsored Convention 
Concerning the Use of Broadcasting 
in the Cause of Peace provided that 
the high contracting parties 
mutually undertake to prohibit, and 
if occasion arises, to stop without 
delay the broadcasting within their 
respective territories of any 
transmission which to the 
determinant of good international 
understanding is of such a character 
as to incite the population of any 
territory to acts incompatible with 
the internal order of the security of a 
territory of a high contracting party.9 
Now, some propose functions of the 
global body that would be vastly 
different. A GCC would retain the 
traditions and needs of the past, the 
close ties to the nation-state. But, as 
the experience of the lTU has shown, 
there is a sharply conflicting role: 
assisting in the world-wide spread 
of technology, which implies 
invading the meaning and 
effectiveness of borders it has almost 
always been committed to preserve. 
The old paradigm is preserving the 
power of the nation:state (or the 
region) to control its internal debate 
(subject, in some way, to human 
rights principles). The new 
paradigm foresees a promotional 
role, one in which, at the end, a 
global system might exist in which 
the power of the state to perform its 
traditional market-regulating role 
would be substantially in question. 
The current reforms of the lTV are 
an example of evolution toward a 
system reflecting, and attempting to 
harmonise, these disparate 
tendencies. In the new system, for 
the convenience of all, standards can 
evolve and rules of the game will be 
discussed to determine whether to 
modify, slightly, the practices of 
satellite-based programmers and 
voice channels to cross borders. The 
reforms clarify and streamline the 
powers of the lTV so that it can 
respond, more quickly, to the needs 
of its very broad range of 
constituents. 
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But to understand its dilemma, and 
that of other proposed global 
regulators, it is useful to return to 
the concept of the market for 
loyalties and how it will be 
established, regulated and policed in 
the future. This is an important 
question, both for nation-states and 
for the global entity, because the 
capacity of states, as I have pointed 
out, to use traditional forms of 
media law to establish barriers to 
entry and to parcel the market 
among various interests (induding 
that of the government itself) is 
deteriorating. The media statutes 
that divide allegiances and control 
narratives already have the aura of 
being of another era, an era in which 
the bounds of competition for 
national identity could be contained. 
While the passion for using law to 
regulate loyalties and fence out 
competition proceeds unabated, 
these efforts seem doomed. 
Increasingly, there is a new market 
for loyalties, a global one. The 
competitors (producers in the terms 
I put earlier), are not only 
governments but great transnational 
corporations, religious entities and 
programmers of signals that bind 
together dispersed ethnic 
populations. The world is moving 
from a highly regulated, carefully 
divided series of relatively closed 
markets for loyalties to a situation in 
which local identities are subject to a 
new set of competitors, relatively 
unconstrained by national 
governments.10 
Modern broadcasting devices, used 
as the perfect instruments for 
maintaining the state, are, also, 
consummate devices for 
undermining the established order. 
The nation state was, as Eli Noam 
has written, "at tension with cross-
border allegiances-whether 
proletarian international solidarity, 
rebellious youth culture, 
international financial capital, or 
ethnic minorities." Now, however, 
new networks (for him the electronic 
capabilities as well as the satellite) 
weaken national cohesion, 
strengthening particularism and 
internationalising it. "lt is difficult 
for a state to extend its powers 
beyond traditional frontiers, but it is 
easy for the new networks to do so." 
Audio cassettes, circulated from 
France to Iran, rendered immediate 
the fiery zeal of the Ayatollah, 
helping to unite opposition to the 
Shah. Radio, in the last days of the 
Soviet era, gave to the people of 
Moscow the sense that they were a 
community, independent, at least, 
and stronger, at most, than the 
organisers of the reactionary coup. 
The lesson is not necessarily or only 
the lesson of freedom: it is also the 
lesson of imperilled narratives and 
susceptible regimes. 
The contest of imagery 
If one way of understanding the 
political essence of society is to 
examine and calibrate its internal 
web of message-sending, 11 then new 
technologies mean that the society of 
reference requires reinterpretation as 
the codes of interconnection are 
modified. The satellite, the most 
modern form of communication, 
echoes ancient forms of social, "the 
older imagining, where states were 
defined by centres, borders were 
porous and indistinct, and 
sovereignties faded imperceptibly 
into one another." Then, the 
technology and organisation of 
imaginings contributed, 
"paradoxically enough, [to 1 the ease 
with which pre-modern empires and 
kingdoms were able to sustain their 
rule over immensely heterogeneous, 
and often not even contiguous, 
populations for long periods of 
time." Now, kingdoms outside the 
established order have a similar 
capability to surmount self-
contained national identities. 
Who are the candidates for these 
new kingdoms? They can include 
dynamic and charismatic religious 
forces, Islamic or Christian. The 
possibilities also include a 
rejuvenated Voice of America, aBBe 
World Service, given a new charter 
by Parliament, or other modernised 
extensions of a national and 
propagandistic past. But mostly, 
these new producers, reaching past 
boundaries, include the kind of 
ideology that springs from MTV or 
the recognisable Western package, 
the appeal to the individual that is 
the underlying drumbeat of 
advertising-supported programs. 
Sometimes these potentates have 
names, in the fashion of the 
monarchs of old, like Murdoch or 
Disney. Already, a global 
competition exists among the BBC, 
CNN, NBC Superchannel and 
Murdoch to establish hegemony 
over global news, if not imagery. 
These are not all kingdoms that have 
the emotional power to sustain the 
imagination of far-flung peoples, 
replacing the current order. There is 
no national identity of Murdoch, no 
flag or loyalty to Disney. But 
between, in general, religious faith 
and consumerism, there seems to be 
passionate battle enough. The 
contest of imagery is more likely to 
be found in the next generation of 
global tensions, not among nation 
states, but rather between clashing 
civilisations, defined by history, 
language, etlmicity and religion. 12 
Seizure of the instruments of 
imagery, as much as weapons of 
destruction, will be a threat of the 
twenty-first century. 
The nature of the global drama, the 
role of the programs and narratives 
poured through the skies as a 
technique of the new era may have 
been best captured-or inferred 
from its opposite-by the gifted 
Polish journalist and author Ryszard 
Kapuscinski. He was writing about 
Iran and the turn to Khomeini after 
the westernising experience with the 
Shah, but the words have a more 
general truth: 
A nation trampled by despotism, 
degraded, forced into the role of an 
object, seeks shelter, seeks a place where 
it can dig itself in, wall itself off, be 
itself. This is indispensable if it is to 
preserve its individuality, its identity, 
even 'its ordinariness. But a whole 
nation cannot emigrate, so it undertakes 
a migration in time rather than in 
space. 
Kapucsinski was writing, here, of 
resistance to existing messages from 
the West, a "walling in" that must 
use every technique possible to 
screen the compelling, attractive, 
permeating voices from without. 
This theory of atavism, this turn 
against modernity, also suggests one 
of the strong motivations, conscious 
or not, on behalf of the West, for 
projecting the enveloping narratives 
of its contemporary radio and 
television. There is a key here to the 
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importance of the stories that are 
pumped into the transition societies 
and the periphery of the developed 
world, a key to the impact of the 
dramas that emanate from the 
dream faclories of Hollywood to be 
delivered to the villages of the 
Carpathians, pub-keepers in Wales, 
shepherds in the Basque Country, or 
workers in Azerbazjian. The rhythm 
and music of Western radio and 
television become, themselves, a 
push toward modernity against 
competing forces. Alan Rusbridger 
of the Guardian caught this "full 
surreality of the New Media World 
Order," in a village, an hour from 
New Delhi, where, adjacent to a the 
temple of the monkey-god, 
Hanuman, "young people chant, the 
family of Yogbal Sharma zaps from 
MTV with its legs, lipstick, kisses, 
jeans, fast cars, beaches, cafes, drink, 
and waterfalls," a representative 
sample of Star TV fare. In the years 
to come, Rusbridger observes, 
children will have to choose whether 
to spend Tuesday evening singing 
songs to Hanuman or watching 
Dynasty." 
Whether the competitors will be the 
powerful but amorphous industries 
of faith, or the distributors of blue 
jeans and alcohol, or empires yet 
unborn, the point remains the same: 
either way, the now-reigning 
oligopolies will be weakened, 
replaced by new allegiances, 
reinforced by a new media structure. 
That will be the case because the old 
market for loyalties survives no 
more. A new market will emerge, 
and it is there that the place for 
global co-ordination, allocation and 
regulation will find its home. 
D. The Market for Loyalties and 
aGee 
The fierceness of competition-both 
for economic markets and for 
markets for identity-underscores 
the barriers to establishing a unified, 
powerful and comprehensive Global 
Communications Commission. The 
situation is increasingly dynamic 
and the competitors not fully 
identified. The existing building 
blocks of international bodies, the 
nation-states, have competing ideas, 
themselves, of the shape of the 
future. Pioneer ways of dealing with 
the new technology suggest the kind 
of steps likely to persist in this 
transformative period. Regional 
multilateral arrangements, especially 
the Television Without Frontiers 
Directive, are harbingers. The 1989 
Broadcast Directive can be read as 
an evolution from long-standing 
national forms of exclusion 
(maintaining monopolies for 
national broadcasters from foreign 
competitors), to a common union 
which encourages trade in ideas 
within the community but seeks to 
control competition from without. 
New technology serves as a prod for 
broader, supranational forms of 
regulation, for loci that provide 
more effective market division and 
policing given the geographical 
sweep of new media. Under the 
Directive, member states are 
responsible to consult with receiving 
counterparts if programming has 
destabilising consequences. The 
European Union is also a forum for 
eliminating natipnal measures in 
which the government maintains 
close to a monopoly for itself. 
Those countries that oppose the 
content of messages coming from 
outside, for religious or political 
reasons seem to have, at present, 
little direct impacl on the behaviour 
of the suppliers of programming. 
There are temporary exceptions, 
recently illustrated by the 
discussions between Rupert 
Murdoch and China over the 
carriage of the BBC. States have 
tried to turn to controlling demand 
for unfavoured programming, 
increasing, as it were, the price of 
viewing. In some settings, a partial 
or wholesale withdrawal from the 
mainstream of world 
communications commerce will be 
attempted so as to prolong the hold 
of existing national identities. 
Such a withdrawal can be policed at 
high cost and is increasingly 
ineffective. In Singapore, a ban on 
the purchase or use of satellite 
receiving dishes, absent a hard-to-
obtain license, is designed to keep 
out those programs that are 
unapproved. Much more vigorous 
efforts to fence out foreign signals 
characterise China and Iran where 
watching foreign programming may 
be a crime.14 These steps are 
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extensions of the most obvious and 
easiest means of creating regulable 
barriers to entry during the early 
television era: to limit the number of 
channels of television available for 
public viewing and retain control of 
the scarce resource and that remains 
the case.15 Prohibition of satellite 
receiving dishes, moratoria on the 
award of broadcast frequencies and 
the maintenance of an uncertain 
legal regime rendering investment in 
cable unlikely are all examples of 
this strategy. In communities where 
feelings are intense, informal 
mechanisms, including the reporting 
of cultural disobedience and even 
terror might be reactions to the 
inevitability of norm-dissolving 
technologies. 
Other instruments for affecting the 
shape of the market for loyalties are 
emerging. Antitrust policy is a 
possible means of affecting 
tendencies toward evolving 
monopolies or oligopolies in the 
software industry, or in the film 
industry, or among the new 
vertically-integrated giants, 
tendencies that may have a 
substantial impact on the competing 
narratives. This is not because 
Japanese-owned Hollywood firms 
will be more inclined to favour the 
country of their corporate owners. 
Rather it is because monopolies 
anywhere in the chain of control can 
and will be reflected in who has 
access to the technology and for 
what programming purpose. In 
some places, moral rights laws, and 
other aspects of copyright are 
hurdles to transnational distribution 
of programming. The United States 
has insisted on improved intellectual 
property regimes, more protective of 
American authors, in the former 
Soviet Union, the China and 
elsewhere, presumably so that, in 
the long run, a more developed 
market can succeed. 
Many of these steps mark the further 
definition of telecommunications 
(and all information services) as 
commodities of trade, not the magic 
force for social cohesion. The very 
definition of information as a 
commodity and not as an engine of 
national identity, however, 
implicates the market for loyalties. 
The emphasis on media as trade 
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tends to move jurisdiction from a 
Global Communications 
Commission toward a World Trade 
Organisation in which the principles 
governing entry and competition are 
bound to have a trade-related 
rationale. Privatisation, too, can be 
seen to shift jurisdiction away from 
the specialised telecommunications 
regulators and toward general trade 
institutions. 
As a provisional resistance to this 
tendency, the European Union, in 
the GATT negotiations, successfully 
insisted on the power to 
discriminate in favour of locally 
produced film and television 
programs as an exception to 
principles of free trade. The Union 
has developed a complex system of 
subsidies and other encouragements 
to create a European cultural space 
and to enhance the capacity of 
Europe to compete abroad in the 
area of programming. But here it 
was acting under the older vision, 
while simultaneously moving 
toward the new. 
When all is said and done, the 
capacity of existing states to regulate 
the narrative of political discourse 
will be reduced by the new 
technologies and the mechanisms 
that are evolving for their 
exploitation. Even in an era of more 
limited broadcast entry, some 
argued that Radio Free Europe, 
Radio Liberty, and the Voice of 
America helped destabilise the 
Soviet regime. If abundant channels 
become easily accessible, universally 
available, and used by powerfully 
charismatic umnediated voices, the 
potential for novel, widespread, 
populist alliances, spreading across 
wide areas, will certainly be realised. 
There will be less control over which 
entities are unhorsed. 
There is no close fit, as yet, between 
a global market for loyalties and a 
global regulating entity, but patterns 
may emerge. We are still at an early, 
frontier-like stage in the overarching 
competition among global voices 
and, as a consequence, no consensus' 
can yet be available on the universal 
questions of standards, enforcement 
and the role of the state .. 
Cautiously, mechanisms begin to 
find their way, mediating trans-
border markets for loyalties, playing 
necessary roles as local states require 
third-party interventions so that 
large-scale technological advances 
can take place. But sovereignty is a 
difficult thing to cede. The 
candidates for power~the ITU, the 
proposed World Trade 
Organisation, the Union on the 
regionallevel~all face the reality of 
sponsors reluctant to delegate or 
recognise that the transfer of control 
has the feel of inevitability. At some 
point, in the not too distant future, a 
global market for loyalties will 
require a global hand, invisible or 
not. But that moment is not with us 
yet. II 
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